Snak

CRICIÚMA LOOKING TO RELIVE THE GLORY DAYS

Heading south from Sao Paulo, Brazil’s largest city and football hotbed it is a little over 500km before you reach the state of Santa Catarina. Bordering Argentina to the west and the Atlantic Ocean in the east it is one of the smallest in the country. Despite this it boasts a strong economy largely fuelled by tourism thanks to a few hundred kilometres of golden beaches and large areas of wildlife and even snow-capped peaks further inland. Santa Catarina proudly claims to have the highest standard of living in Brazil and possibly all of South America. However on the football pitch it lags well behind its larger neighbours in the heavily populated South East of the country.

Figueirense and Avai from the state capital of Florianopolis have made several recent appearances in Brazil’s top division without making much of an impact while Joinville enjoyed a period of moderate success in the 1980’s. Only once has a football side from the state really hit the national headlines. In 1991 a relatively unknown young Brazilian coach led a small lower league club to win the Copa de Brasil. It remains the only time that a Santa Catarina team has won a major national honour.

That team was Criciúma Esporte Clube. A club that had folded in the 1960’s and had only very recently become a force in the Campeonato Catarinense (Santa Catarina State Championship). Based in what is only the fifth biggest city in Santa Catarina and doesn’t even make the top 100 in the country, their success was it’s fair to say somewhat unexpected.

Having shocked Internacional and Sao Paulo during an unlikely run to the Semi-Finals the previous season, Criciúma were no longer a totally unknown force. However given their lowly standing in the Brazilian league structure and the previous failings of any team from the region to compete for major honours few thought their 1990 run was anything other than a one-off. However their newly appointed manager for the 1991 season had other ideas and the side set about the challenge with the belief they could repeat the heroics of the previous campaign.

The coach who was about to win his first major trophy in Brazilian football was a certain Luiz Felipe Scolari. His team’s success was no fluke. Criciúma won their five two-legged knockout ties without losing a single match and conceded just four times in the competition. A series of resolute and disciplined performances saw them overcome three top division clubs. The second leg of the final at the Estadio Heriberto Hülse in Criciúma saw the hosts play out a tense goalless draw with Gremio to triumph on the away goals rule.

Looking back the match was of huge significance not just for Criciúma who claimed their first national silverware and qualified for the Copa Libertadores but for Brazilian football as a whole. Scolari had spent a decade trying and for the most part failing to make a significant impression as a manager in both Brazil and the Middle East. He left Criciúma soon after their Copa do Brasil victory with a much enhanced reputation and took over the reins of defeated finalists Gremio in 1993. Just nine years later ‘Big Phil’ had become one of the most decorated and popular Brazilian managers of all time with eight major titles to his name including of course the 2002 World Cup. Should he repeat the feat on home soil in 2014, he will be immortalised into Brazilian football legend even if few outside of a small town in Santa Catarina remember how his managerial career really kicked off.

The following season without Scolari the Brazilian minnows almost trumped their remarkable 1991 Cup run as they competed in the Copa Libertadores. With a much improved stadium and facilities in order to comply with Libertadores rules, crowds of upwards of 30,000 roared the Serie B club into the Quarter Finals of South America’s showpiece club competition. A narrow 2-1 aggregate defeat against eventual winners Sao Paulo was the end of the clubs one and only continental venture but those two years have left something of a lasting legacy on the club.

Criciúma were also promoted to the top tier of Brazilian football that season and maintained their status amongst the country’s elite for five straight seasons. However things tailed away after that and despite a brief re-appearance in Serie A, they seemed to be heading back down to what arguably was a more natural standing in Brazil’s extensive football pyramid for a club of their size. In 2009 the side endured a dismal run in Serie C and briefly flirted with relegation to the oblivion that is the 40 team fourth division. Tales of Scolari, cup glory and Copa Libertadores campaigns must’ve seemed like a distant memory and the club were once again also-rans in a small state that barely registers on Brazil’s football map.

However fast forward to the present day and Criciúma are turning heads once again. Against the odds they have made it all the way back to the top flight and will be the only side from Santa Catarina to compete in the 2013 Campeonato.

Their rise back was eventful. Protests against the board led to the departure of president Edson Burigo in early 2010 and the return of Antenor Angeloni, a man who had twice previously held the position. Angeloni set about trying to move the club forward but even he couldn’t have expected quite the speed or indeed the manner in which Criciúma would progress. With a disillusioned and dwindling fanbase back onside the club were promoted back to Serie B in 2010. However various poor runs and disappointing showings in the Campeonato Catarinense combined with Angeloni’s ruthless ‘hire and fire’ policy saw six managers come and go in little over a year. Even by Brazilian standards the club were seriously lacking in stability ahead of the 2012 Serie B campaign and privately the president was expecting a season of struggle.

Current manager Paulo Comelli took over a side that had lost their last five matches to only finish 7th in the State Championship, the prelude to the 2012 season. At just 52 years old, incredibly this is already his 40th managerial appointment and having rarely lasted more than a season at any of his previous clubs, few were expecting the Comelli-Angeloni relationship to last long. However his appointment turned out be an unlikely masterstroke.

Comelli won seven of his first eight games as an attack-minded Criciúma soared to the top of Serie B. Their approach was bordering on reckless at times and there were several blips along an exciting yet bumpy road to an unlikely promotion. They twice found themselves 4-0 down at home, once nearly coming back to draw after a late flurry of goals against Gremio Barueri. The inspiration on the pitch was Ze Carlos, a striker who had previously drifted from one loan spell to another and was once sent off after just seven seconds of a match. For Criciúma however he was consistently brilliant scoring 39 goals in 43 appearances and the pre-season relegation candidates finished as Brazilian football’s top scorers. In the end the club had to settle for second place after losing three of their final four games, but were still promoted despite conceding 57 goals, ten more than Guarani who were relegated to Serie C.

Currently the club are competing for the Campeonato Catarinense, a title they haven’t won for eight years. Ze Carlos has left, moving to play in the Chinese Super League something that is a significant blow to Criciúma’s prospects. However the attacking philosophy has continued and there are still goal threats in the side. Four players have arrived on loan from Cruzeiro including Fabinho while the arrival of Elson from Russian club Rostov will bolster their midfield options. Their defence remains a concern however and one way or another the presence of Criciúma is sure to liven up this year’s Serie A.

For president Angeloni, it’s precisely fifty years since he first became involved with a small club recently founded by a group of teenage boys looking for something more competitive than street football. Criciúma Esporte Clube have come a long way since those days and although again there is little expectation for the coming campaign that will surely suit a club that has grown a taste for punching above their weight. Comelli’s attack-minded side are a contrast to the organised and well-disciplined unit that claimed the club’s only major silverware in the early 90’s. However they will certainly gather inspiration from Scolari and the class of 1991 and there won’t be many teams looking forward to visiting a packed Estadio Heriberto Hülse when the Campeonato kicks off in May.

Et af kultholdene i Latinamerika....artikel i forbindelse med relanceringen af klubben...

THE STORY OF THE LEONES NEGROS

Mariachi wasn´t the only sound rolling through Jalisco in the 1970´s.

Originally, they weren’t even known as the Leones Negros (Black Lions). Debuting in the third division of Mexico’s footballing abyss in 1970, the University of Guadalajara’s football club originally led a mundane existence as the Venados (Deers). Rambling through isolated locales unable to house teams in the higher levels of Mexican football, the Venados won some, lost some, and presumably, drew some. But really, could anyone but the most self- damaging be bothered to check third-division results?

Of course, when access to football is limited, people naturally grow unstable and grope for any rendition of football which crosses their path. However, in the case of the Venados, local access to football was plentiful, if not excessive.

Founded by Spanish forces in 1532 as a settlement designed to defend against hostile natives, the city of Guadalajara grew to become Mexico’s second largest city during the 20th century, a city with a fascination with the most plebeian of pursuits, football. With notable teams such as Deportivo Oro, Nacional Guadalajra, Club Atlas, Estudiantes, and the most popular club team in Mexico, Chivas, the Venados were an insignificant club in a city where football was happening. Real football.

Things began to change for the Venados at the conclusion of the 1972 campaign in the most important of areas: club nickname. Invited to take part in Mexico’s second division for the 1973 season, management at the University of Guadalajara grew concerned that Venados was a bit soft for the new division and the lucrative markets it opened. Adopting the name Leones, the University of Guadalajara had for all purposes, a perfect season. Top of the table, most goals scored, least goals allowed. The Leones were simply dominant. Of course, as fans of U de G were fated to eventually discover, the Leones had a habit of breaking down during critical moments. They lost 3-2 on aggregate during the Championship play-off against the Tigres of Nuevo Leon, forcing the University to purchase a first-division franchise to continue their stumble through Mexican football.

Capitalizing on a vast reserve made possible by student tuition, the Leones ensured that their first year in the top-flight would be a memorable one. Rather than reinforcing the squad with local bargains, the Leones looked towards the abiding marrow of the footballing world, Brazil. The arrival of Brazilians such as Amaral, Jair de Jesus Pereira, and Carlos de Jesús Eusebio, alongside Brazilian coach José Gomes Nogueira, saw a local squad suddenly become cosmopolitan. Long obsessed with more fashionable squads such as Atlas and Chivas, Guadalajara quickly developed a new favorite who promised skill and beauty in a typically stoic and turgid league.

The Brazilian imports were more than a marketing gimmick, and had resumes to legitimize their signings. Pereira was a player regularly called to play an auxiliary position in a Brazil squad that included Brazilian legends Rivelino and Jairzinho. Carlos de Jesús Eusebio himself had only a year previously led Santos to a state championship alongside attacking partner Pele. Supplemented with local talent, the Leones had become a national force, practically overnight.

The new-found interest in the Leones was quickly rewarded with a new nickname and a dominant season. In a league where foreign imports were rare, the Leones soon became known as the Leones Negros (Black Lions), due to the number of black players within the squad. Setting a national record with 42 points, the Leones offered a fashionable and overtly Brazilian style of play, where head coach Nogueira gave them free reign to express themselves. Opposition teams found their only option was to constantly go in hard on the Brazilians, in an attempt to interrupt their movement. The Brazilians responded by doing what Brazilians are prone to do: simply dribble around their would-be attackers.

The Brazilian penchant for the audacious endeared the Leones Negros to opposition fans across the nation. In a league historically dominated by clubs like Chivas, Toluca, America and Cruz Azul, U de G become the second team of fans who hoped for a diversion from the norm. Flags in the U de G colors of black, yellow and red became regular features amongst opposition crowds as demonstrations of support for an almost subversive club. Unfortunately, the dominant regular season did not result in a successful post-season, as the Leones Negros again lost in the Championship playoff.

Rather than dwell on an ultimately unsatisfying season, the Leones Negros augmented the squad with Mexican legends such as El Protillo Manuel Najera, and Nacho Calderon, a keeper whose three-million peso transfer broke league records. Chivas had put a price tag on Nacho only to entertain the keeper’s desire to test the transfer market; they had never expected a club to agree to the exorbitant sum.

With the best of domestic and Brazilian talents, the Leones Negros embarked on their gilded age, stunning opposition crowds with their displays of skill. The club quickly became one of the most popular attractions nationwide, yet would have to wait a few more years for their first official title.

The arrival of a new university President brought with it a new directive for player development: rather than base the club on transferred players, the club would now look towards its youth academy to provide the core of the squad. While the First Team continued their cavalier play, again losing in the 1977 Championship final, U de G’s academy developed and seemed destined for a bright future. Young players such as future U de G captain Jorge Davalos disrupted opposition tactics with their vigor and tenacity. Constantly pressing rival clubs into forced mistakes, the U de G youth squad won their Championship in 1978, giving the Leones Negros their first official football trophy.

The focus on youth paid dividends throughout the 1980s, as the Leones Negros set records for most points in a season, and reached two Championship finals. Yet, as often was the story with U de G, the Leones Negros were unable to convert regular season dominance into post-season success, losing the 1984 and 1989 finals in dramatic fashion, giving up late goals in both games. The 1989 loss especially painful as a 2-1 aggregate lead in the return leg turned into a 4- 3 loss by the 90th minute. The following season saw the Leones Negros win the domestic cup, but an air of resignation surrounded the squad, as it proved the last opportunity for success for the ageing squad who had displayed a constant professionalism, even in their academy years.

A number of mixed seasons brought about by dud transfers and changing University priorities culminated in the Leones Negros being sold to the Mexican Football Federation as a means to reduce the number of First Division squads in order to increase the revenue of other teams, ending a 20-year stay which had seen them grow from an irrelevant third division squad into one of the most entertaining first division sides in Mexican footballing history. A club which garnered plaudits from across the nation for a belief in a freely-attacking style was gone. A large part of Mexican football culture had dissipated due to corporate manoeuvring.

The story of the Leones Negros isn’t one which ends on a down note. Where corporate considerations had resulted in the team being disbanded, corporate considerations also brought about the reformation of the club. 15 years after their last game of professional football in the first division, the Leones Negros entered Mexico’s Second Division after an investment drive by the owner of former rival, Chivas. A mass of futures are available for the Leones Negros. Currently sitting in tenth position with only another month left in the season, U de G will have to look towards next season for a potential promotion push. Judging by the 40,000 fans who showed up for their first Second Division home game, the future looks positive.

De argentinske hold har kørt godt i denne uge i Copa Libertadores. Sejr til Boca, Vélez, Arsenal og Newell´s, mens Tigre havde fri i midtugen. Tror sgu at ham Frans trækker i nogle tråde.
Ellers noget af en match mellem Arsenal og São Paulo. Ney Francos 3-5-2 var en katastrofe rent defensivt. Forsvaret var hullet som en si.
Atlético-MG får masser af ros for 2-1-gevinsten i de bolivianske højder mod The Strongest. Ronaldinho var nøglefiguren. Han sørgede for at Galo kunne hvile med bolden i nogle vigtige momenter, og det er vigtigt, når holdkammeraterne er gasblå i masken af at spille i 3.600 meters højde.
Flot opvisning af Corinthians hjemme mod Tijuana. Den tidligere Flamengo- og Bayer Leverkusen-spiller Renato Augusto var banens bedste. Også han har været plaget meget af skader, men er nu på rette spor. Det samme er Pato, selvom han måtte gå ud med muskelproblemer. Helsesektoren siger, at Pato sidder over i weekenden, men han er snart klar igen. Jeg tror, at Pato fik 11 kampe i træk. Det er ikke set siden længe.
Harlem Shake er nu kommet til Brasilien. Det er Corinthians, der breaker med denne video:
http://www.youtube.com/w…Im-zEdek9Mg

Fed læsning om klubben, jeg alt for sjældent kan stave til.
- Vidste slet ikke, den var grundlagt af de spanske styrker, siden den har sin nationalistiske "Basker-politik".

Guadalajara
Guadalajara
Guadalajara
Guadalajara
Guadalajara
Guadalajara

Nu skulle den sidde dér.

Ja det var et par vilde kampe...håbløst defensivt arbejde af Sao Paulo, bevares Arsenal er ikke dårligt hold - men, men , men - det skal de lukke af for...var ikke særligt imponeret af Luis Fabianos erstatning i front Aloisio...derimod ser Osvaldo rigtig rigtig rigtig spændende ud... godt af Felipão at få ham på landsholdet...

Corinthians atte Tijuansa på plads ...de ser stærke ud...(når de gider) :-)

FF 17...

Yeps der er båtnakker fra... Club Deportivo Guadalajara aka Chivas - nationalisterne ..Chicharito´s gamle klub...dem som fyrede Cruyff som sportdirektør 100% mexikanske spillere...så er der Atlas (Jalisco) eks Barca spiller Rafael Marquez er fra deres Cantera ....de har El Clasico Tepatio de spiller mod Chivas...så er der Club Deportivo Estudiantes Tecos de la Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara aka Tecos...som rykkede ned sidste år...

og så er der Leones Negros de Universidad de Guadalajara, favoritterne - som nævnt i artiklen - de sorte løver grundet hudpigmenten på spillerne...altså nok ikke Patrice Evras favoritklub.

Faldt lige over den her....Nice piece om supporter/Barra Brava - kulturen i Argentina...og så på engelsk...


CANTERO BATTLES THE BARRA BRAVAS

Bespectacled and a little pudgy, with the amiable features of a trusty family accountant, Javier Cantero does not radiate a sense of overwhelming charisma or bravery. Yet the recently-elected president of Independiente, one of Argentina´s most popular football clubs, has taken it upon himself to almost single-handedly confront the menacing barra bravas; the hooligan gangs who run mafia-like operations from the terraces of stadia across the country.

Cantero was voted in as president of Independiente in December, 2011 with over 60% of members’ votes on the back of a campaign denouncing violence and promising an end to the close ties between club authorities and the barra brava groups. Riding the momentum of his decisive victory, Cantero reiterated his anti-hooligan stance. He immediately announced that the club would no longer financially support the activities of these groups.

The somewhat bemusing reaction of the head of Independiente’s barra brava, Pablo “Big Baby” Álvarez, was to hand in his resignation to Cantero. The new president was obviously unable to accept the resignation of a person who had no official position within the club, had not been democratically elected by anybody and conducted the majority of his activities outside of the bounds of legality.

In order to appreciate how such an absurd scenario could arise, an understanding of the operational structure of barra brava gangs across Argentinian football is needed.

The barra bravas, who usually number no more than a couple of hundred members, even at major clubs, wield massive influence over the institutions they claim to support; offering backing to club presidents in exchange for large financial rewards in the form of free tickets to games, which are then sold on for profit, control of food and drink sales at the grounds, control of parking around the stadium and even cash gifts in order to purchase flags, flares and streamers. Some barra brava groups even receive percentages of players’ transfer fees when multi-million dollar moves to overseas clubs take place.

The barra bravas are not only influential over internal club politics, but are often linked to provincial and national politicians as well. Argentinian football’s governing body, the Asociación del Fútbol Argentino (AFA), has done next to nothing to curb the power of the gangs. The President of AFA, Julio Grondona, has been in power for 33 years, during which time the violence surrounding football has only increased. Of the 262 football-related deaths since 1924 in Argentina, 162 have occurred on Grondona’s watch. There have been four fatalities so far in 2012, the latest of which was Sergio Victor Fernández, a fan of Newell’s Old Boys who was shot dead by Union barra bravas after the two local rivals played each other on May 12.

The AFA President will occasionally speak out against the power of the barra bravas, but actual change has seemed an unlikely prospect, at least until the emergence of Cantero. In April, 2010, Grondona told a group of politicians belonging to the Sports Commission that, “the barras are used in football and in politics. It’s big business.” He went on to blame ‘Executive Power’ for the problem.

“The first step is for club directors to stop dealing with the entrance tickets and the current protocols – if it is even possible to take them away from the barras, because this is already a business. It’s not as though they give them the tickets to get in to the stadium; they sell them and then enter for free. So we are going to speak clearly about this, because there is not one club director who, if approached by a barra brava, won’t give him match tickets,” he said.

Strong words indeed, yet in June of the same year, a combined group of barra bravas from different clubs, under the name Hinchadas Unidas Argentinas (Argentina Fans United) travelled to the World Cup in South Africa on the same flight as the Argentina team and its delegation. Julio Grondona denied claims made in many media outlets that the AFA had in fact paid the hooligans’ passage to the tournament. His attempts to disassociate AFA from the nefarious individuals were not helped by revelations that shirts and other merchandise that they intended to sell during the competition were stored at the delegation’s headquarters, or that a representative of the group, Hernán Palavecino, sat in on an official Argentina press conference and was also photographed with his arm around a smiling Grondona.

Big monetary incentives mean big stakes, and violence often rears its head as factions within the barra bravas fight for control of the money-spinning operations. Guns, knives and drugs are regularly confiscated off groups travelling to and from games by police, but it is clear that many weapons and illegal substances slip through unchecked. Regular fans have long dismayed over the situation. The threat of violence at and around stadia makes attending matches an uninviting prospect for many regular supporters. Meanwhile, inept (or complicit) police officials offer little in the way of a solution.

In this footage, one faction of the Boca Juniors barra brava is shown arriving at the Bombonera stadium (Boca’s home ground) for a match against Atlético Rafaela in 2011. Grey-haired Rafael Di Zeo had recently been released from prison after serving four years for aggravated assault. The former leader of Boca’s infamous barra brava, known as ‘La 12’, waves his entry ticket in the air triumphantly; this is his first home game after leaving prison and he is back to reclaim leadership of the group from the man who took over in his absence, Mauro Martin. Many others in Di Zeo’s party pass through the gates without showing a ticket, nor are they searched by security or the police. One federal policeman smiles and pats Di Zeo on the back as the gang floods through the gate, La 12 capos themselves waving through whomever they deem eligible to enter the stadium. During the match, the Di Zeo and Martin blocs took up positions in different sectors of the ground, chanting death threats to each other and making throat-cutting gestures. The leadership situation of La 12 remains unresolved, and the risk of warfare between the rival factions remains high.

The situation at Boca Juniors is hardly unique. Incidents of hooliganism are reported with depressing monotony in the news. River Plate fans famously tore apart their own stadium and the surrounding neighborhood when their club was relegated to the Second Division for the first time ever last June after several years of poor performances. A San Lorenzo player, Jonathan Bottinelli, was attacked by three barra bravas after a training session in October. Angered at a perceived lack of effort from the team, the heavies were unmolested as they entered the training facilities and assaulted the player. This season, Second Division team Instituto de Cordoba were flying high at the top of the table and looking certain to be promoted to the top flight, but a run of bad form was deemed unacceptable by the club’s barra bravas, who last week threatened to kill the players if they do not gain promotion at season’s end. In recent days, Racing’s star Colombian midfielder, Giovanni Moreno was stopped as he left training in his car. Barra bravas held a gun to his leg and told him if he didn’t leave the club they would end his career.

The physical menace imposed by these hooligans, and the fact their operations are so deeply ingrained within the fiber of Argentinian football culture and society itself, makes the stand Javier Cantero is taking against them all the more laudable. Earlier this month, when the Independiente president refused to allow the group to continue storing their banners at the club’s stadium, about 30 barra bravas marched into his office to demand retribution. Cantero was not harmed, though he and other club officials were subjected to threats and insults.

“The majority of people are against them, and I represent those people. I’m afraid, I’m not crazy. But they are not going to twist my arm because they came into my office,” Cantero told Central Fox.

“It’s not true that you cannot fight them, but sometimes there is no desire to,” he said.

Following the incidents in his office, Cantero requested that police ban several of the group’s leaders from attending Independiente’s next game at Arsenal de Sarandi’s stadium. The match was interrupted for some minutes as, in response, those men and their cohorts threw rocks and bricks into the ground from outside. The following week, a bomb hoax was phoned in to the Independiente elementary school, which operates as a part of the club, and various administrators received death threats in the mail. The second vice-president of the club has taken a month’s leave after his daughters begged him to walk away from the club for fear of his safety.

Though Cantero has received some verbal backing from other teams’ presidents and the AFA, the response from officialdom has generally been lukewarm. No other club has yet followed Cantero’s lead by taking similar steps to eradicate the barra bravas. On May 22, Cantero spoke with exasperation at the lack of real action from his counterparts, singling out Boca president Daniel Angelici.

“He manages a club where the thugs are treated differently to ours,” he told Radio La Red. “At Independiente the barra is renounced, at Boca they pose for photos and sign autographs.”

The general football-loving public’s reaction, on the other hand, has been of overwhelming support. #FuerzaCantero (Strength Cantero) was trending worldwide on Twitter within hours of the storming of his office. On May 11, hundreds of Independiente fans marched to the club’s headquarters in an expression of encouragement for the President, and to direct anger at the hooligans who have hijacked the sport for personal gains. Since February, Independiente has gained more than 12,000 members, an influx that indicates Cantero has captured the public’s imagination. Fans of other clubs too have expressed solidarity and begun to demand, through banners and chants at matches, that their own presidents act against the violence.

The hooligans, however, are hardly going to sit by and watch their livelihoods disappear. On the same day as the pro-Cantero march, the head of the Independiente barra brava, Pablo Álvarez, gave a press conference in the high-end Buenos Aires neighborhood of Puerto Madero. The group’s lawyer was present, as was spokesman Hernán Palavecino, the same man who travelled to the World Cup with Julio Grondona and the Argentina national team. “Big Baby”revealed he had started legal proceedings against Cantero for slander. Though the threat of legal action is most likely an idle one, the very fact that a group of football thugs can hold a press conference attended by dozens of journalists, flanked by lawyers and associates of high-ranking officials, demonstrates the sense of entitlement they have after so many years of running their thinly-disguised extortion racket with virtual impunity.

Javier Cantero may look like a nice guy, but he will need to tap into all his inner reserves of ruthless determination if he is to emerge victorious from the ominous battle ahead.

The Boca Factory

Youth development will always be a huge talking point in the modern game, some clubs choose to embrace it, others prefer to buy it. Caleb Cousens talks us through a success story.

Those of you who have been reading my blog will have seen that I am obsessed with youth academies. I honestly believe that having a successful youth academy, along with scouting, are the keys to the long-term success of your club. You have also probably seen that I cannot stand teams that do not bring youth through their ranks and rather raid other teams’ talented products.

What makes a good youth academy? I believe that if a team’s youth system consistently brings amazing players to their senior team (or other senior clubs) then you have the recipe for success. Also if the players you bring through your system stay loyal to you then you must have done something right as well. When I think about the most successful youth academies in the world a number of clubs come to mind: Barcelona, Sau Paulo, Sporting Lisbon, and Ajax have brought forth some of the best players in football at the moment. Between those four clubs we have players like Edwin van der Saar, Messi, Cristiano Ronaldo, Robinho, Diego, Xavi, Clarence Seedorf, Fabregas, and Nani.

But it was only recently that I even considered Argentine club, Boca Juniors, in that list and now I would probably rate them higher than the rest. First, here are some statistics:

in the last decade, Boca have brought through and sold 350 home-grown players of all ages. From that list there is currently 138 academy graduates playing around the world including 36 in Argentina, 20 in Spain, 10 in Italy, 3 in England, and many others in places ranging from Germany and Holland to China and Israel. So that is 35 leagues with players that were raised and developed by the Boca academy system. Just last season they handed debuts to 14 youngsters (and all of them are expected to play for the biggest clubs in Europe in a few years time).

Boca Juniors were struggling in the mid 90s. Arch-rivals River Plate had dominated Argentina for decades, the national team was filled with River Plate youth products and they were the best in the Argentine league. In 1996 new ownership took over Boca Juniors and the ownership stated that rather than buy players for huge money only to put too much expectation on them and watch them under-perform, they wanted to create their own stars. Fans love a player who has come through the club more.

This outlook worked and now Boca Juniors are one of the most followed teams in the world football.

Some key points to their success:

- The Boca Juniors hired two very influential figures; one was leading expert of youth in Argentina who at Newell Old Boys created a fantastic scouting network. The second was the king of ´baby football´ (indoor 6-a side football for 5-12 year olds). The second guy alone discovered Carlos Tevez (Man United), Fernando Gago (Valencia). While the first discovered (among others) Nicolas Burdisso (AS Roma) and Ever Banega (Valencia) and between these four players they almost raised 100 million Euros.

- The scouting system is comprehensive. They have a scout in every small town and close to every village. Nearly all are ordinary people (teachers, butchers and policemen) and the head of the youth system Jorge Griffa regularly traveled around Argentina when he took over and listened to the watching crowd, hiring the most appropriate as a scout for the area. From this system they gain about 25,800 players in trials, from which they sign about 40.

- The youngsters are taught the same formation (4-3-1-2) from early on to the first team. This makes fitting into the first team far easier for a young player. This is coupled with a similar playing style (one of the staff at Boca states that the style is "we don´t use sweepers and we like attacking full backs") to Barca who have a similar philosophy in terms of all youngsters playing the same way as the first team (a variation of Ajax´s total football).

- Curiously, they really build up the physical side of their youths. The youngsters have as hard a pre-season as a professional. They even do tests to determine what height a player will grow to. They also benefit from the sheer number of players that could come into the club, it means that the current crop can never relax. If player’s don´t push themselves they will fall back and may have to quit the club. Interestingly, Gago was almost one of these players but the coach backed him and told him to stay as he could make it.

The success of the club since the “from the roots up” system was brought in has been huge. They have won the Argentinian Apertura 5 times and the Clausura twice since 1996. They won the Copa Libertadores (Champions League of South America) four times since then as well. It goes to show the impact that a successful youth policy can have. They now have 300 football embassies worldwide to find great foreign youngsters, they are marketing themselves amazingly, and they’re now reaping the rewards in Japan and China.

I will leave you with the words of the chief scout of Boca Juniors, "We started this 12 years ago, and it takes that amount of time to start seeing real results. But after that, it will never ever stop. Trust me. The world will keep hearing about Boca from now on."

baggrunds artikel til den tredje største Clásico (efter Boca - River og Racing - Independiente) i argentinsk fodbold...
-et par år gammel ...but still useful...


Scoundrels and Lepers - The Clasico Rosarino

On Saturday 20 November Argentine club Rosario Central played in a Rosario derby, however it was not the world famous clásico rosarino with Newell´s Old Boys, it was a game against Tiro Federal played in the Argentine 2nd division.

There will be no "proper" Rosario derby this season for the first time in 25 years because at the end of the 2009-10 season Central were relegated for the first time since 1984 when they lost a relegation/promotion playoff against Buenos Aires minnows All Boys after a surprise 0-3 home defeat in the 2nd leg.

Fans of South American football will miss the clásico rosarino as it is one of the most vibrant and colourful derbies in world football. The rivalry dates back to 1905 and has been played as a championship decider in 1974 when Newell´s beat Rosario Central in the final of the Nacional championship and on the continental stage in the Copa Libertadores in 1975 and the Copa Sudamericana in 2005.

The team’s nicknames derive from the same incident. Central are known as canallas (scoundrels) because in the 1920s they refused to play in a friendly match for a leprosy charity, Newell´s Old Boys played instead and earned themselves the nickname los leprosos (The Lepers). Central fans are notoriously proud of the claim that Che Guevara was a loyal Central supporter, giving his voluntary work at the Peruvian San Pablo leper colony in 1951 an aspect of penitence for the actions of his club.

People often ask which Rosario team is the best, the answer is usually that it is too hard to call, Central have 105 wins to Newell´s 100 in the derby, Newell´s have 5 league championships to Central´s 4, Newell´s were twice runners up in the prestigious Copa Libertadores final but Central have actually won an international tournament, claiming the less prestigious and now defunct Copa CONMEBOL in 1995. This season however, the answer must be Newell´s, they have played in the Primera División continuously since 1963 and Central are currently the most successful and well-supported team in the second division.

It is hard to explain how such a grand and well-supported club has come to be in this position, only 10 years ago they reached the semi-finals of the Copa Libertadores and 5 years ago they were still good enough to qualify to play at the continental level. The first major signs of problems were an embarrassing bottom of the table finish in the Apertura 2007 tournament with only two wins in nineteen games and a turbulent 11 months between December 2006 and November 2007 in which they had five different directors including a court appointed emergency team.

It is not often a useful exercise to draw parallels between sides in different leagues and on different continents, however a comparison with the situation at Leeds United is hard to avoid. Both clubs have large fan bases, they both have four major domestic honours and have had success in lesser continental competitions, they both played in the semi-finals of the premier continental championship at the beginning of the last decade, they both found themselves in severe financial difficulties and have suffered relegation to the lower leagues. Another link between the clubs is that Central´s distinctive blue and yellow colours were inspired by the blue and yellow Leeds United kit that was phased out by Don Revie in 1961.

Despite all these similarities, the causes of the economic problems at the two clubs had different origins and to simplify things a lot, Leeds United borrowed beyond their means to compete at the highest level of European football and Rosario Central suffered from a number of distinct problems, including the aforementioned boardroom instability, the sale of their two most promising players Angel di Maria & Andrés Díaz to Portuguese side Benfica in order to pay off some of the debts in 2007, then the loss of highly regarded midfielder Tomás Costa to FC Porto in 2008. The club has also suffered from extraordinary instability in the dugout with an astonishing 21 managerial changes since the departure of Miguel Ángel Russo in 2004.

Their poor form continued into the following season despite their chairman Horacio Usandizaga´s idea of a motivational speech in which he threatened to kill the players and coaching staff if the club were relegated. At the end of the season they finished 17th in the relegation table and faced a two legged playoff with Belgrano de Córdoba. They won the game to remain in the top flight however despite the return of iconic player Luciano Figueroa in 2009 they finished in 17th place again in 2009-10 and this time they lost their place to All Boys who had until then been stuck in the lower leagues since 1980.

After relegation Central seriously struggled to adapt to life in Nacional B failing to win any of their first four games and occupying a place in the automatic relegation places until October. Their form has steadily improved and they have gradually climbed towards the promotion places. Before the derby game with Tiro Federal they slipped back a bit, losing to debutants at the national level Boca Unidos and then suffering a 4-2 defeat at promotion rivals Atlético Túcuman on the Wednesday before the derby game.

Their first derby against Tiro Federal since the smaller club’s single season in the Primera División in 2005-06 went well for Central, they won 1-0 with an 80th minute penalty from Luciano Figueroa. They currently lie five points behind league leaders Atlético Tucumán and three points shy of the promotion places. With 23 games of the season remaining there will be plenty of opportunities to close the gap, however a poor run of results could land them back in the relegation places as anything less than 1.25 points per game would probably leave them amongst the bottom four teams in the relegation table and in danger of slipping into the regionalised 3rd division, which would be unthinkable for a club of their stature.

Bottinelli, liberado por la policía tras un secuestro

BUENOS AIRES -- El entrenador de River, Ramón Díaz, modificó nuevamente el dibujo táctico en el ensayo del jueves y sacó del equipo titular a David Trezeguet y Juan Manuel Iturbe, por lo que el equipo que el domingo visitará a Newell´s es una incógnita.

Además de Trezeguet e Iturbe, los que salieron de la formación con la que había probado el miércoles fueron Diego Martínez y Cristian Ledesma, y los que ingresaron fueron Luciano Abecasis, Ariel Rojas y Carlos Luna.

En tanto, el dibujo táctico pasó del 4-3-3 con el que ensayó el miércoles a un 3-3-2-2 con la presencia de más jugadores aptos para defender y en el que Sánchez y Rojas se movieron como los mediocampistas más adelantados.

La sorpresiva formación que paró el técnico en la práctica a puertas cerradas en el Monumental fue con: Marcelo Barovero; Gabriel Mercado, Adalberto Román, Jonathan Bottinelli; Abecasis, Leonardo Ponzio, Leonel Vangioni; Sánchez, Rojas; Rodrigo Mora y Luna.

Ese equipo le ganó 1 a 0 con gol de Mora a uno conformado por suplentes y juveniles.

Las presencias de Abecasis y Vangioni, quienes pueden jugar de laterales, en el mediocampo, hablan de una clara intención de tomar ciertos recaudos defensivos por parte del técnico.

En relación con la formación que puso el miércoles, salieron Diego Martínez, Ledesma (tiene una contractura), Iturbe y Trezeguet, pero desde el cuerpo técnico dijeron por lo bajo que el equipo recién se resolverá luego de la práctica del viernes.

El entrenamiento del viernes será a las 15 en el Monumental y, curiosamente, Ramón Díaz dará una conferencia de prensa a las 14.