Redigerettirs 22. mar 2022
@Diogenes: Vildt nok at du mener at det er SÅDAN sådanne undersøgelser kan bruges.... altså at det siger noget KUN om den situation der specifikt undersøges....
Altså, det er en undersøgelse som vedrører en straffesparkskonkurrence, så derfor kan de psykologiske aspekter IKKE overføres til andre lignende situationer.....
At sparke først i en straffesparkskonkurrence, er vel meget sammenligneligt med at spille først. I begge tilfælde kender den der kommer efter, altså resultatet af det første forsøg/kamp.
De prøver faktisk at skrive lidt mere generelt om det:
"We have found that in a dynamic competitive setting, when information on the performance of the competing agents is available or released in the interim periods or stages, the state of competition may have an impact on performance. Thus, these results highlight the role of performance information in competitive settings and also show that, in terms of the theory of optimal incentive provision, the timing of tasks can be important exclusively for psychological reasons: even when the order of the tasks is determined through a perfect randomized trial, the outcome can be ex post unfair.
One way to accomplish an ex post fair outcome would be to require that the agents perform their task simultaneously. Another would be to require that interim performance be only privately observed and not publicly. In our specific setting it may even be optimal to require that agents perform their task before the game starts.
In more general settings where other factors such as the choice of effort levels and risky strategies may play a role, it is entirely an empirical question how the psychological effects we have documented interact with decision-making processes and how they then jointly determine performance.
Hence, the results have implications for the merits of different incentive schemes and for the choice of performance information revelation rules. For instance, school officials can decide whether or not to reveal the scores of the students in each round of a contest; in political competitions, election commissions may design specific policies about the release of information regarding voting tendencies before the date of the election, and in competitions for promotion in internal labor markets principals may decide whether or not to reveal their (partial) assessment of the performance of workers before the competition is over."
Samtidig skriver de også at det er ENORMT svært at undersøge... så hvor meget eller lidt man vil stole på et enkelt studie, vil jeg lade op til den enkelte... men læs da hele papiret, før du bedømmer det!
QPR - Og ignorerer (u)tilfreds, så godt jeg kan.