@T
https://x.com/TheAthleticFC/status/1930520211339325666
Du tænker nok på den her grafik som The Athletics nye finansekspert har lavet. Læste lidt i artiklen og det virker mere som et estimat end fakta da det i Uniteds tilfælde vist ikke er selve Manchester United regnskabet men et moderselskab eller noget i den dur. Den var svær at forstå synes jeg og læste ikke teksten til de andre klubber om det var det samme.
Det er dog lidt interessant og mærkeligt at man skulle være i en bedre position end en klub som Pool f. eks mens Chelsea selvsagt er nr. 1 med alle deres loopholes som vist i øvrigt nu er lovlige at lave for alle klubber i ligaen hvis det skulle være nødvendigt da klubberne ikke stemte imod det.
Det viser dog det vi i en del tid har debatteret. Det er ikke længere PSR der er problemet men likviditeten og det er måske også derfor man er villig til potentielt at tage PSR tabet på Højlund for at få mere likviditet.
Edit:
Manchester United’s PSR position is calculated using the accounts of Red Football Limited (RFL), rather than Manchester United plc (RFL is a subsidiary of the plc entity).
That’s a pretty big factor, as in recent years the pre-tax result of those companies has diverged significantly. In 2023-24, Manchester United plc lost £130.7million before tax; for RFL, the deficit was just £36.2m. Per UEFA’s most recent European Club Finance and Investment Landscape report, pre-tax loss figures for United were €22m (£19m at the exchange rate used in the report) in 2022-23 and €42m (£36m) in 2023-24 — an exact mirror of the pre-tax results in RFL’s accounts.
Based on RFL’s loss figures, it’s a struggle to see how there were ever any PSR worries at the club — though that’s only true once Ratcliffe’s arrival was accompanied by equity investment, which raised United’s three-year PSR loss limit from £15m to £105m.
United could lose around £141m in 2024-25 and still comply with Premier League rules. In other words, they’ll be fine this summer, however surprising that may seem.
https://x.com/TheAthleticFC/status/1930520211339325666
Du tænker nok på den her grafik som The Athletics nye finansekspert har lavet. Læste lidt i artiklen og det virker mere som et estimat end fakta da det i Uniteds tilfælde vist ikke er selve Manchester United regnskabet men et moderselskab eller noget i den dur. Den var svær at forstå synes jeg og læste ikke teksten til de andre klubber om det var det samme.
Det er dog lidt interessant og mærkeligt at man skulle være i en bedre position end en klub som Pool f. eks mens Chelsea selvsagt er nr. 1 med alle deres loopholes som vist i øvrigt nu er lovlige at lave for alle klubber i ligaen hvis det skulle være nødvendigt da klubberne ikke stemte imod det.
Det viser dog det vi i en del tid har debatteret. Det er ikke længere PSR der er problemet men likviditeten og det er måske også derfor man er villig til potentielt at tage PSR tabet på Højlund for at få mere likviditet.
Edit:
Manchester United’s PSR position is calculated using the accounts of Red Football Limited (RFL), rather than Manchester United plc (RFL is a subsidiary of the plc entity).
That’s a pretty big factor, as in recent years the pre-tax result of those companies has diverged significantly. In 2023-24, Manchester United plc lost £130.7million before tax; for RFL, the deficit was just £36.2m. Per UEFA’s most recent European Club Finance and Investment Landscape report, pre-tax loss figures for United were €22m (£19m at the exchange rate used in the report) in 2022-23 and €42m (£36m) in 2023-24 — an exact mirror of the pre-tax results in RFL’s accounts.
Based on RFL’s loss figures, it’s a struggle to see how there were ever any PSR worries at the club — though that’s only true once Ratcliffe’s arrival was accompanied by equity investment, which raised United’s three-year PSR loss limit from £15m to £105m.
United could lose around £141m in 2024-25 and still comply with Premier League rules. In other words, they’ll be fine this summer, however surprising that may seem.
Manchester United
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