Snak

De forudgående dages diskussioner... Er med på at fingrene indimellem flyver hurtigt over tasterne, men læs dog hvad TW skriver; frustrerende at se hvordan der fordrejes, (fejl)tolkes og ikke bliver læst, som det er skrevet.


Der Spiegels interview med Angela Merkel kaster kraftig reaktion af sig i Rusland:
https://tass.com/politics/1547779 - krig er grusom hvorend den udspiller sig - og denne startede nok ikke først og pludseligt for ti måneder siden.

Feathergodt

"Når det sagt så gentage det er Rusland der bærer ansvaret for den her krig. Men det gør ikke lidelserne mindre hos også de russiske mødre og fædre der modtager beskeder om deres sønner der er faldet i kamp."

Enig det er også vigtigt at huske Putin og den russiske ledelse er årsagen til det.

@Fetah

"Hvis vi endelig skal kunne konkludere noget om sandhed og fakta i denne krig, så er det at der bliver løjet fra begge sider, stærkere end en hest kan løbe.
Og gælder ikke bare det her aktuelle tilfælde, men ved næsten alt hvad der kommer ud."

Det er rigtigt, at der er meget forskellige tal, hvilket der da også er rigtig mange på twitter der borer i. I den forbindelse kan det være en god ide at se på OSINT-konti (OSINT = Open Source INTelligence). Her beskæftiger man sig med det der rent faktisk er visuelt bekræftet og geolokaliseret. Her støder man selvfølgelig ind i nogle lavere tal. Dels pga. at nogle tal er overdrevne, dels pga. at ikke alt er visuelt bekræftet og geolokaliseret. Eksempelvis findes her en liste over visuelt bekræftet og geolokaliseret russisk udstyr: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html?m=1

Hvis man herudover optæller hvor meget udstyr ukrainerne har erobret så er russerne sjovt nok den største enkeltleverandør af udstyr til den ukrainske hær.

Derudover kan man jo eksempelvis holde de daglige russiske opdateringer op imod hvad der rent faktisk er leveret. Eksempelvis påstår russerne at have ødelagt 8 HIMARS systemer mere, end der rent faktisk er leveret - hvilket jo nok ikke er helt korrekt. Omvendt påstår ukrianerne, at de ikke har fået ødelagt et eneste HIMARS system.

Når det kommer til tab af menneskeliv så findes der russiske opdateringer, ukrainske opdateringer, opdateringer fra ISW, skøn fra USA, fra EU etc. og lægger man alle disse sammen ligner billedet noget i stil med 100.000 dræbte og sårede på ukrainsk side (hvad "sårede" dækker over er ret usikkert) og er lidt højere tal på russisk side. Der er væsentlig flere civile tab på ukrainsk side end på russisk side.

Man kan selv rode rundt på nettet, så er det muligt at danne sig et lidt bedre og mere nuanceret overblik. Men, selvfølgelig er der stor usikkerhed. Ser man på internationale neutrale opgørelser er det selvfølgelig der mest sikre billede. Her er der dog typisk kun medtager hvad der med sikkerhed kan bekræftes og dermed er tallene væsentlig lavere end hvad de reelle tal er.

Et tal som jeg personligt finder uhyggeligt er den seneste opgørelse fra FN´s menneskerettighedsorganisation hvor det anslås, at 17,7 millioner mennesker har brug for humanitær bistand, og 9,3 millioner har brug for mad og andre fornødenheder i de ukrainsk kontrollerede områder.

Endelig besværliggør de russiske restriktioner på ytringsfrihed i høj grad verificering af russiske oplysninger samt det faktum at internationale organisationer ikke kan operere i de russisk besatte områder.

Et par kritiske og væsentlige artikler, som understreger at russerne (eller Vesten) tilsyneladende ikke kommer nærmere en forhandlet løsning:

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/peace-proposal-russia-shadows-versailles-205973
https://www.newsweek.com/what-emmanuel-macron-security-guarantees-mean-ukraine-war-russia-1765971

Et lyspunkt er dog at russerne og amerikanerne stadig kan øve diplomati, hvilket den kontroversielle udveksling af Griner/Bout viser.

Gode nyheder:

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ukraine-drone-warfare-russia-732jsshpx

https://mobile.twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1601671273452822528

Glimrende nyheder.
Det ville være fantastisk, hvis man samtidig kan udruste Ukraine med kraftigere langdistancevåben, så man kan ramme mål dybt inde i Terrorstaten.

Så ser det ud til at Rusland er kommet af med nogle Nazister i Ukraine
https://nyheder.tv2.dk/udland/2022-12-11-wagner-gruppens-hovedkvarter-haevdes-angrebet-flere-doede

...godt nok nogle de selv har sendt ind, men det hele tæller vel på bundlinjen

Fra berlingske:

Det ligner Putin er bange for den russiske presse og offentlighed

"Intet er, som det plejer i Rusland: Putin aflyser sin årlige pressekonference
Den russiske præsident, Vladimir Putin, aflyser sin store årlige pressekonference, der normalt kan vare op til flere timer.

Det oplyser hans mangeårige talsmand, Dmitrij Peskov.

Peskov kommer ikke med nogen forklaring på, hvorfor pressekonferencen aflyses, men han siger til journalister, at Putin »jævnligt taler med pressen, også ved udenlandske besøg«.

Berlingskes Rusland-korrespondent, Emil Rottbøll, siger, at det er overraskende nyt:

»Det er et brud med en mangeårig tradition, og det er endnu et tegn på, at intet er, som det plejer i Rusland. Kreml siger ellers hele tiden, at alt går efter planen. Men det bliver mere og mere tydeligt – også for de russiske medier – at det er løgn,« siger han.

Det er første gang i et årti, at den russiske præsident ikke skal afholde pressekonferencen, skriver journalist for ABC News
Patrick Reevell."

Mersheimer er mere og mere på glatis med sin "realisme"

"You also said to me, back in February, “The argument that the foreign-policy establishment in the United States, and in the West more generally, has invented revolves around the claim that [Putin] is interested in creating a greater Russia.” Do you think that that’s something he’s more interested in now?

No, I’ve thought from the beginning that this conflict is all about balance-of-power politics. The conventional wisdom in the United States is that it’s not about balance-of-power politics, and, in fact, Putin is an imperialist who is interested in conquering Ukraine for the purpose of making it part of a greater Russia. I don’t think that is the case. I don’t think he had or has imperial ambitions. What motivates him is fear of Ukraine becoming a part of nato.

Do you think there’s a reason Putin himself has been talking about this in terms of imperial ambitions? He talked about Peter the Great. “What was [Peter] doing?” Putin asked. “Taking back and reinforcing. That’s what he did.” He then said, “And it looks like it fell on us to take back and reinforce as well,” in terms of returning land to Russia. How do you view those comments?

He did not make any comments of those sorts before February 24th. And the only such comment he has made since February 24th is the Peter the Great comment. I don’t think that’s indicative that he is interested in conquering all of Ukraine and making it part of the greater Russia. He has never said that. What he’s interested in doing is conquering those four oblasts in the eastern part of Ukraine. And he was not interested in conquering those four oblasts before the war started. It was only after the war started.

We know that?

Yes.

Oh, O.K.

There’s no evidence that he was interested in conquering those four oblasts. The war started on February 24th. On February 21st, he gave a famous speech—this is three days before the war started—where he recognized the two oblasts in the Donbas. This is Donetsk and Lugansk. He recognized them as independent republics. So he was not interested in conquering that territory.

He was forced into invading them?

Well, I think that what happened was, on February 24th, they invaded Ukraine. And what invariably happens when a war starts is that not only do goals escalate but the means of waging the war escalate. In terms of the goals escalating, what happened here was he decided at some point that these four oblasts would become part of Russia.

There was an argument about what Putin’s aims were, whether they were primarily imperial—about taking more land and integrating it into Russia—or whether they were about nato expansion. And then the war starts, and, at least in the areas that he’s conquered, he seems to be pursuing the former goal. It feels a little unprovable to say, well, he’s only doing that now, not because the people saying so initially were right.


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Well, first of all, there’s no evidence that he had imperial ambitions before the war. He would have had to say that it was desirable. There would have to be evidence that he had said that it was desirable to conquer Ukraine and incorporate it into Russia. There would have to be evidence that he had said it was feasible. And there would have to be evidence that he had said that that was what he was doing. And there is no evidence to support any of those.

Why would him saying one thing or the other before the war count as evidence necessarily?

Well—

Russia meddled in the 2016 Presidential election, but Putin says they didn’t. So what does that prove or not?

All we can do is base our judgment on what his intentions were on the available evidence.

So, not on what happened but what he said before the war?

Yes. It may be that thirty years from now we unlock the archives and discover that there is massive evidence that he was an imperialist at heart. That is possible, but we do not have any evidence of that sort at this point in time. We have a huge amount of evidence that it was nato expansion and the more general policy of making Ukraine a western bulwark on Russia’s border that motivated him to attack on February 24th.

He has said that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. He said that before the war.

He said that in a famous article that he wrote on July 12, 2021. But in that same article, he made it very clear that he recognized Ukrainian nationalism, that he recognized that Ukraine was a sovereign state. There is no evidence in there that he was bent on conquering Ukraine and incorporating it into a greater Russia.

Before he violated Ukrainian sovereignty, he respected Ukrainian sovereignty, because he said he did?

I’m just telling you what he said in the July 12, 2021, article that he wrote, the famous article.

I just meant that if he’s saying that he respects Ukrainian sovereignty and then he invades Ukraine, it makes me wonder if we should believe him when he says he respects its sovereignty. I don’t know.

I have another point to make that’s really important. What we’ve been talking about are Russian intentions, and in particular, Putin’s intentions. What did he intend to do? We also have to look at capabilities. The Russians did not have the military capability to conquer all of Ukraine. At most, a hundred and ninety thousand Russian troops went into Ukraine. There is no way a hundred and ninety thousand Russian troops could come close to conquering and occupying all of Ukraine."

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/john-mearsheimer-on-putins-ambitions-after-nine-months-of-war

Derudover så nægter han helt at snakke om hvorfor han var i Ungarn og snakke med Orban.


Derudover så er der gode nyheder fra Slovakiet der gør klar til at sende deres 12 MIg 29 til Ukraine det er en betydelig styrkelse til det Ukrainske luftvåben som før krigen havde 43 Mig 29.
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/slovakia-prepares-to-send-mig-29-fighters-to-ukraine-soon

Generelt når vi ser ind i 2023 så skal Ukraine have flere fly (først nok fra andre østlande og siden F-16) flere kampvogne (igen først mere lagre fra østlande og så vestlig) samt langtrækkende våben som UK har åbnet op for.

En Ukrainsk sejr kan meget vel kræve et indhug i EU/USA våbenlagre, det er dog en lille pris at betale for en sejr i Ukraine.
Hvis russerne mobiliserer igen i januar så kan det godt blive en lang krig hvor Rusland nærmere sig Ukraine i antal soldater hvorfor Ukraine skal bruge bedre og flere våben mens de russiske lagre tømmes mere og mere.

Som minimum vil det give en ny stærk allieret i Ukraine og en fredsdividende i hvertfald frem til 2030 hvor det russisk militærs offensive kapaciteter vil være knust.
Endnu mere lovende så krigen fører til regimeskifte i Rusland (og Belarus) hvilket kan sikre demokratiet en lang bedre position i verden end vi startede med i 2022.

Positivt med MIG-29. Det har godt nok også taget lang tid af få på plads. Det var tilbage i juni de meddelte, at de ville sende dem til Ukraine.