Opgørelse af material tab i Ukraine estimerer at Russerne har mistet cirka 3,5 gange så meget som Ukraine 5139 vs 1476.
https://medium.com/@zs.lazar1/125-days-of-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-on-ten-charts-5f5f12607730Dette dækker over en række kategorier:
Tanks
R 936
U233
Armoured Fighting Vehicles
R 530
U 129
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
R 1,017
U 196
Armoured Personnel Carriers
R 142
U 96
Infantry Mobility Vehicles
R 114
U 126
Engineering Vehicles And Equipment
R 180
U 23
Other Vehicles
R 1,396
U 342
Artillery
R 226
U 101
Anti-air
R 98
U 112
Aircraft
R 203
U 82
De har sammenlignet men antal aktive systemer før invasionen (dermed er nye produceret/købt/givet systemer og reserven.) for de fire store kategorier.
Tanks
R 32%
U 27%
Andre armeret køretøjer
R 35%
U 45%
Artilleri
R 5%
U 6%
Fly
R 15%
U 37%
Det er massive tab for begge sider, konklusionen er negativ at Rusland måske kan nedslide Ukraine, men i processen også nedslide sig selv i høj grad.
Givet en 3,5 til 1 tabsrate for russerne mener jeg vesten bør overveje om det er muligt at sende tanks og fly til Ukraine som er det de først løber tør for, netop fordi vesten sender andre amereret køretøjer og artilleri.
"As can be seen from the graphs, the increase of the losses follows a parabolic path; therefore, the FORECAST function — which is linear regression analysis — is far from perfect when it comes to projections. However, even if the results have to be taken critically, it can be seen that the moment when the opposing parties simply run out military equipment in some cases is not far away, especially, when it comes to tanks or other ground vehicles.
In fact, since losing around 50% of military equipment can already be fatal, the collapse is even closer than the forecast function would show and could happen around late summer or early autumn, simply because of the nature of attrition warfare: there will not be enough military equipment to continue. This is especially true in the case of the Ukrainian forces, where the losses of heavy weaponry (for instance, tanks) and aircrafts are already at a critical level.
Therefore, it is likely that Moscow’s new main objective is to bleed out the Ukrainians. This strategy — in contrast to the first phase’s big ambitions — is not unrealistic at all since Ukraine is losing a huge amount from a much smaller inventory.
Moreover, while Russia can utilise equipment from its reserves, the Ukrainian forces have a limited number of tanks, armoured vehicles and aircraft. Therefore, if the losses continue at the same pace on both sides, a drastic shift in the opposing force’s military power can easily be a game changer and turn the Ukrainian military’s resistance down. In other words, a momentum-gaining, dynamic Russian force that simply outnumbers the Ukrainian forces in the critical frontlines can lead to heavy, irreplaceable losses, especially if the Ukrainian side is left without foreign military aid.
It is also notable that the opposing countries face different challenges when it comes to resupplying. While Ukraine can get both Soviet-made — systems known by its armed forces — and Western equipment, Russia has to rely on its own production and stockpiles. Currently, this production is slowed — and, in many cases, halted — by the sanctions, and if Moscow turns to external sources to replace its losses, then it will further decrease its reputation as a global power.
Therefore, it can happen that despite all the ambitions and efforts, in the end, Russia will demilitarise not only Ukraine but also itself. The prolongation of the war and the need to replace the large amount of lost equipment could open a new era of industrial warfare, where the arms race is going to be one of the determining factors."